Justice, Turning Points, and Bridging Research and Practice: Daniel Druckman Reflects on a Career in Peace and Conflict Research

Interview conducted by Polly Walker
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Daniel Druckman is Professor Emeritus of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University and Honorary Professor at Macquarie University in Sydney and at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia. Dr. Druckman has published widely on international negotiation, justice, nationalism, peacekeeping, and research methods. The following interview took place prior to a master class and workshop that Dr. Druckman conducted, titled "From Research to Practice in Peace & International Studies," at the Baker Institute for Peace & Conflict Studies at Juniata College.

Polly Walker: *Let us begin with some content, Dan. Tell us a little bit about your career motivation, particularly your reason for choosing to do research on peace and conflict issues.*

Daniel Druckman: Let me give you some background for how my interests developed and then you might better understand my answers to the more substantive research questions to follow.

I grew up in New York City where I developed an early interest in studying prejudice. I wondered why people inside and outside of my family circle were judgmental about others not like themselves. This was the question that motivated my interest in studying psychology, thinking that was the field most likely to understand the sources of prejudice.

My first scholarly exposure to the topic was a 1954 book written by Gordon Allport titled *The Nature of Prejudice.*[1] My second was a 1960 book written by Milton Rokeach titled *The Open and Closed Mind.*[2] I learned a lot about Rokeach's research, first as a student in his class at Michigan State University in the late fifties. Following that, I began graduate school at Duke University in 1962, where I studied sociology and took a course on social stratification taught by Ida Harper. I was just beginning graduate school and that course provided me with an opportunity to connect sociology with psychology.

I wrote a term paper for that class entitled "Social stratification and cognition." What I did in the paper—keep in mind that I was twenty-one years old—was to attempt to understand thought processes,

the way people think through the external lens of social structure. Believe it or not, that paper was the basis for a career where I have been particularly interested in the linkages between micro-level processes and macro-level structures, as well as interdisciplinary analysis. I wonder how many of us refer back to student papers as being foundational?

Then I went off for doctoral studies at Northwestern University, where I was a research assistant on a project on the cross-cultural study of ethnocentrism, led by Donald Campbell (a social psychologist) and Robert LeVine (an anthropologist). That experience was compatible with my early interest in prejudice, but changed my perspective from a focus on the individual to a focus on groups. I began to realize that prejudice, ethnocentrism, and nationalism are embodied within groups, not just individuals; and that was an important insight.

The shift in focus is evident in one of my first publications, which was in 1968 and entitled "Ethnocentrism in the Inter-Nation Simulation."[3] It was a large laboratory simulation where we studied a form of prejudice referred to as in-group/out-group bias. I was fortunate to get the article published early in a very good journal.

But then it became time to do my dissertation and I slid back to more of an individual focus, away from the group. My dissertation was a laboratory study on simulated collective bargaining. It appeared in 1967 as an article in the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*.[4] A follow-up study appeared in a 1968 issue of the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*.[5] For social psychologists (by the way, I did go into social psychology at that point) in my generation, a big issue was the relative importance of the person (what the person brings to a situation), the situation itself, and the role that the person is playing or obliged to carry out. The study was a comparison of the relative importance of person, role, and situation. Rokeach's work was influential, but so too was the work done by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton, who studied the role of representation, and Bernard Bass, who studied pre-negotiation experience. I found that situation and the person's attitudes were more important than role of representative. That was a finding that I built on considerably, and by 1994 was ready to perform a meta-analysis of eighty studies that were published since my dissertation, more or less confirming the results of the dissertation study.[6]

That is the background that spurred a career doing research for more than fifty years. The research was performed in a number of very different kinds of work settings. I was not a professor until my mid-fifties. I worked for research institutes or think tanks, consulting firms, and the National Academy of Science, until George Mason University came along and asked if I would like to help develop a new institute for the study of conflict and conflict resolution. As an academic, I continued to search for a bridge between ideas at the individual or small group and collective levels of analysis. As we go on and talk about some of my other projects, I think that the interest in connecting levels will become evident, particularly since I ended my formal career not as a social psychologist but as a political scientist.

Walker: *The most recent string of studies that you have been doing have been on justice and peace. When did you begin this research and how long have you been doing it?*

Druckman: I began doing that in 2008. A former student and colleague, Cecilia Albin, at the University of Uppsala in Sweden, asked if I would like to join her in trying to develop a project on justice, which was at that time more her interest than it was mine. I said, "Yes, let's give it a shot." We thought the project through and wrote a small paper that was sent to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. At that time, the Ministry was establishing a branch that would support peace research; we tried to get in on the ground floor. We sent them a three-page concept paper. They wrote back to us quickly and asked, "How much money do you need to do the project?" We thought that this was a good sign. We asked, "Do you want us to develop a full proposal before we commit to a budget?" Their reply was, "No, we just wanted to know how much money you need to carry out the project." We told them the amount, they said okay, and the grant monies arrived. That was the easiest grant that I ever received. We were off and running.

My portion of the grant went to the University of Queensland where you (Dr. Walker) were also located at the time. We began work modestly. We wanted to know if justice in the negotiation process and in the peace agreement would result in a stable agreement. We studied sixteen civil wars that occurred just after the Cold War, from 1990 to 1995. They were homogeneous in that sense, but they were all over the world, and we discovered some interesting relationships between procedural justice in the process, distributive justice in the outcome, and stability of the agreement. Cecilia Albin and I published two articles on that grant, in 2011 and 2012, and said, "Things are going well, let's keep this research going and see if we can get another grant."[7] And we did.

The second grant was for three years, from a bank foundation in Sweden. This project consisted of expanding the previous studies beyond peace agreements to arms control, environmental negotiations, and trade talks. We analyzed samples of twenty cases in each of those areas. Cecilia and I were encouraged by the results and desired to keep the collaboration alive. We next tried the Swedish Research Council and, lo and behold, received two grants from them. By then I had already moved from the University of Queensland to other universities in Australia: the University of Southern Queensland in Toowoomba and then to Macquarie University in Sydney. Those projects produced a number of interesting publications.

Walker: *If you were to select a key insight from that research, what would it be?*

Druckman: I think the key insight is the importance of social conduct. This refers to the way we behave toward each other. If there is a lot of transparency in the negotiation process and the parties perceive that they are being treated fairly, the chances are increased that there will be both a durable agreement and a more lasting peace in the society. Those findings go back to my Duke term paper where I was making the case that cognition is embedded in social structure. Social conduct is a micro-level variable; it refers to how we behave toward each other. More positive conduct at the micro level leads to stable agreements at the meso level and to peace at the macro or societal level. This is quite a stunning finding and is key insight from this research.

Walker: *What would you say are some of the practical implications of that research?*

Druckman: I think those implications have to do with the way that a negotiation or peace process is structured. You must give examples of positive social conduct and provide opportunities for the expression of procedural justice even among antagonists who have been at war with each other for many years. Unfortunately, we have a U.S. president who does not do this. If you think about Donald Trump's behavior on the one hand and our research findings on the other hand, then you would heartily criticize our president for his unjust behavior. This behavior is escalating conflict rather than encouraging sustained peace.

Walker: *You have also written about the distinction between settlements and resolutions. What is the difference between these two?*

Druckman: Settlements are agreements that stop the violence. They are usually, but not exclusively, cease-fire agreements in international relations. But we have settlements in collective bargaining, domestic disputes, and marital conflicts as well. Essentially, we are taking a time-out and learning how to deal with each other so as not to ignite the flames. In other words, practicing good social conduct. Resolution, on the other hand, is a deeper process leading to a more permanent settlement. Resolution deals with the sources of a conflict and the willingness to talk about these sources to discover new ways of cooperating. We not only tolerate each other and control or manage our relationship, but begin to like and respect one another. The transition is from divided to shared identities. This distinction is developed further in my 2002 article in *International Negotiation*.[8]

Walker*: How might interveners turn negotiated settlements into longer-term resolutions?*

Druckman: That is the big question. Let us look at a specific example. Mozambique was one of these poster-child peace agreements in 1992, lasting for about twenty years. When the rebel organization, RENAMO, became a political party and had equal rights to full citizenship, we thought that the problems of civil war were solved. Well, not so. After two decades following the peace agreement, RENAMO still maintains a military wing that came to a realization that the agreement did not live up to their long-term expectations. The prospects for employment of their members were not noticeably different than prior to 1992. Their political prospects were not propitious. They never won an election. Their best electoral result was coming in second, Thus, the group did not have sufficient political power to bring change. Their solution was to return to violence by terrorizing communities to get their point across. In essence, they gave this agreement a chance and willingly went into it but it has not worked. Seeing no plausible alternative, RANAMO returned to fighting.

What can be done to avoid backsliding following an agreement? The lifespan of peace agreements is often short. There have been a number of solutions suggested by the conflict resolution community. The most prominent is probably the approach spearheaded by John Burton, Herbert Kelman, Christopher Mitchell, Ronald Fisher, and Nadim Rouhana, referred to as the "conflict resolution workshop."[9] The leaders of the workshops engage the quarreling parties in retreats, often away from the limelight. These interactions do produce attitude change during and following the workshop. The situation is very powerful; they begin to trust each other in a way that they did not before.

There are two problems: one is, depending on the conflict, the good feelings do not last long, and the other is the changed attitudes do not transfer to the societies. The workshop participants need to persuade their policy makers that the Palestinians, the Northern Irelanders, or the Turkish Cypriots are not so bad. Well, you can imagine what that dynamic is like. Often the workshop participants face the anxious prospect of being regarded as traitors.

Further, our academic community has never resolved the problem of transferring workshop results to the larger societies. We are excited about what can be done with people in small groups. But these results are limited to the sentiments expressed by the participants toward one another.

As we look around the world, we see settlements, not resolutions among neighbors: between Israelis and Palestinians, between India and Pakistan, between Azerbaijan and Armenia, between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus. For the most part, they tolerate each other. At best, these conflicts are managed. How then can we move from settlement to resolution, particularly in enduring civil wars? Deeper insights are required, particularly with regard to the relationship between ideology and identity. One wonders whether resolution is ever possible.

I will speak about these dynamics later in the context of some other questions. Looming large are issues of fear, insecurity, and identity. These matters are usually addressed in psychotherapy. Leonard

Doob, an early pioneer of the conflict resolution workshop, took a clinical approach. He invited clinical psychologists and psychiatrists to participate in the workshops and that decision turned out to be a disaster for both the participants and for Doob. The participants rebelled against the facilitators and Doob became the target of threats.[10]

Walker*: Another topic that has consumed your professional interest over the years is "turning points." What do you mean by turning points?*

Druckman: This was a topic I took up when I worked at a Maryland consulting firm from 1975 to1982. My job was to analyze an ongoing negotiation between the United States and Spain over military base rights. I was allowed access to transcripts and cable traffic that I read in order to try and make sense out of the discussions. I noticed that there were departures in the process where sudden progress occurred. These departures appeared most often following a negotiating crisis, when the talks came to a halt. The parties in this case were quarrelsome. They would actually leave the table and fly home to either Washington or Madrid.

The impasses were due largely to Spain's attempts to change the agenda. They were no longer interested in the key issue, which was granting base rights to the U.S. Rather they put pressure on the U.S. delegation to plead their case for membership in NATO. They were an authoritarian country ruled by General Francisco Franco. There was no way that the NATO governments would be willing to accept Spain as a fellow member of the alliance.

The bases were held hostage to resolving these larger issues, leading to four major breakdowns in the talks. Negotiations that should have run about two weeks lasted a year and a half. It was only resolved when Franco died on 20 November 1975; the agreement was signed at the end of January 1976. That experience led to an interest in the idea of a critical moment. These moments often followed a long impasse.

Since then, I have devoted considerable energy to developing the idea further. The first published study was on the Spanish bases talks, and it appeared in 1986.[11] The second study was on the intermediate nuclear force (INF) reduction talks, appearing in print in 1991.[12] A third study, published in 2001, consisted of analyzing thirty-four cases of international negotiations.[13] These cases were divided into the categories of security, trade, and environmental or political talks. The statistical analyses revealed the importance of precipitating factors as causes of turning points. We learned that an external intervener is important to get agreements in security negotiations such as arms control or ending a civil war. However, internal precipitates were more important in trade and political talks.

This line of research continued, resulting in about a dozen publications. It was a popular niche within the conflict resolution literature. I did a couple studies with Larry Crump in Brisbane on complicated multilateral trade negotiations and conducted laboratory experiments with Mara Olekalns at the Melbourne Business School. The laboratory experiments addressed the question of whether a turning point could be predicted. All of our previous studies were retrospective, where we turned the clock back and observed what led to the known outcome. This contrasts to experiments where we look forward and see what happens. Much of this research is reviewed in my 2013 *Handbook of Negotiations* chapter with Mara Olekalns.[14]

Walker: *What would you say, out of all of that, are some practical implications of this research?*

Druckman: If you know what precipitates a turning point or departure, then you probably know how to bring it about, thus solving the negotiating dilemma. Although turning points can be negative, they usually propel the negotiation forward. Thus, learning more about the events that precede the turning point could lead to progress in almost any kind of negotiation; however, the kind of precipitants are likely to differ in different kinds of negotiations. This research also connects with the popular 2000 book, *The Tipping Point,* by Malcolm Gladwell.[15]

Walker: *One of your earlier interests was nationalism and patriotism. It is particularly salient in current politics. How do you distinguish between nationalism and patriotism?*

Druckman: Nationalism is the combination of amity and enmity: adulation for my own nation combined with dislike, even hostility, toward other nations. The other nations are often construed as enemies. Patriotism is adulation of one's own nation without the baggage of dislike. It is a challenge to develop strong positive feelings toward your own nation without casting aspersions that express hostility toward other nations.

Walker: *Along those lines, national identities have evoked very strong emotions. Why is that?*

Druckman: One reason is fear and the need for security. Another is the connection between self-esteem and group identity; a larger identity enhances one's self-esteem. These are emotional processes that we all experience. The reason why nationalism could lead to war, or at least mobilization and willingness to die fighting for your country, is because our definition of self is intimately tied with the groups with which we identify. Why do we root for our favorite sports team; why is this so important? Why does it matter if

the Cubs or the Dodgers win a baseball game? Well, if you are from Chicago or live in Los Angeles, it matters; and for many people, it matters a lot. Identity is critical in the expression of amity for one's own nation and enmity toward others. There is also a connection between those sentiments and the road from settlement to resolution. Resolutions are unlikely to occur until we can reframe issues sufficiently to develop a common or a shared identity.

Walker: *What is your take on the Need for Enemies hypothesis that Vamik Volkan and others have put forward?*

Druckman: There is the suggestion that we are born with this need. In his 2006 book, *The Human Potential for Peace,* Douglas Fry presents empirical evidence from numerous cultures and peace communities suggesting that we do not harbor a need for enemies: the potential for peace is as strong as the potential for war.[16] He made a strong case for the absence of a need-for-enemies. Recent evidence from studies on neuroplasticity supports Fry's conclusions by showing that our species adapts to changes in environments. An enemy can quickly become a friend (or vice versa) as shown over and again in international relations. We are not victims of inborn needs; we are, however, victims of the cultures that we develop. We are socialized to cooperate and to compete. The relative emphasis placed on these orientations varies with types of cultures, notably those that are individualistic—like the United States— and those that are more collective, like the Scandinavian countries.

Walker: *Could you give us an example of how socialization might produce a strong identity without the accompanying emotional vigor?*

Druckman: If you look at the groups that Fry studied, or, say, at the Kibbutz communities in Israel, you will observe a strong group identity with the accompanying responsibilities to contribute to those groups. These group members take pride in the results of their contributions. The pride does not depend on having outgroups. Of course there are often threats to your group, in which case it is in your interest to protect against those threats. It may be important to have a defense force in case your community is invaded. But the growth process is rooted in a community that works and an identity that is larger than self. This is evident in the communities that Fry studied.

Then there is political ideology, and what I am talking about does reflect a more progressive approach that emphasizes forward-looking change. As social science researchers, we aspire to bringing about the conditions that lead to a sense of identification without the corresponding need for casting aspersions on anybody else who is not part of our community. This aspiration is relevant to a variety of

organizational settings including the universities in which we study and work. I have addressed these issues in several places, starting with my 1994 article on nationalism and patriotism published in the *Mershon International Studies Review.*[17]

Walker: *In the workshop tomorrow you will be talking about the well-known contact hypothesis. What is the debate around contact and peace?*

Druckman: Educational exchange programs historically have accepted the proposition that contact produces cooperation. Allport, in his 1954 book that I mentioned at the very beginning of the interview, introduced this hypothesis, but qualified it by enumerating the conditions under which contact is likely to lead to cooperation. These conditions include (1) equal status contact, or at least the perception that we are equals; (2) institutional legitimacy of the contact, namely, that the contact occurs in an organizational context that both countries approve of; (3) the contact occurs in a context of cooperation; and (4) that the parties share a goal of cooperating. If those conditions are met, contact is shown to lead to more cooperation.

A 2006 meta-analysis done by Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp analyzed 550 studies.[18] The results showed that contact *per se* without preconditions is good enough; that contact does lead to cooperation under most circumstances. But they also showed that it is enhanced further, that is, the chances are that the cooperation will be sustained through time, if the contact occurs under equal status conditions and is institutionally approved. These findings support Allport's earlier research. The remaining question is, how long will the cooperation last? Can there be some backsliding? The Pettigrew and Tropp study did not collect data over time to ascertain whether the cooperation achieved was durable.

Walker: *Other than the ones you have already mentioned, what would be some other practical implications of the research on the contact hypothesis?*

Druckman: We are going to talk about summitry later in the interview, but I will say a few things about it before we get more deeply into that topic. Summit meetings are examples of contact at the level of national leaders. The thinking is that if leaders get together formally and have a structured conversation, their nations will benefit. This turns out not to be the case. Summit meetings are notable for their ineffectiveness in managing conflicts. It is also the case however that communication, contact, or dialogue between leaders is less about what they are discussing—less about the content of the conversation—and more about the experience of talking. Just engaging, even if you disagree, is positive because it develops a relationship. It may be a bumpy ride, but it is a relationship nonetheless. Most of all,

you have developed the foundation for continued dialogue. One wonders whether this occurred as a result of the Trump-Kim Jong-un conversations. This is as good a practical implication as I can offer.

Walker: *You have done a lot of research on mediation. Has mediation been effective in resolving international conflicts?*

Druckman: Not really. Jacob Bercovitch has accumulated the largest data set on international mediation.[19] About 45% of the historical mediations have resulted in successful negotiated agreements; by successful, I mean that the negotiation resulted in an agreement that lasted for a while. This is not a wonderful record of accomplishment. One reason is that nations are sovereign entities; they take great pride, and go to great pains, to preserve their sense of independence. Because of that, it is difficult to enlist a mediator who is going to tell them what they should be doing. After all, a mediator is not an arbitrator; national representatives do not have to take the mediator's advice and, thus, the impact of international mediation is not impressive. Further, many mediators are high-profile politically appointed international diplomats. They are often not trained in the skills of mediation.

Having said that, research does offer hope. For example, a 1994 study done by Kenneth Kressel and his colleagues compared two styles of mediation.[20] One was called a settlement-oriented style (SOS). The other is a problem-solving style (PSS). Kressel found that there was a preference for SOS in most of his mediation cases. However, when the mediators used a PSS approach (in 41% of the cases), they found that more durable agreements resulted. The PSS approach does not strive for a particular settlement. It attempts to shift the framing from competitive bargaining to cooperative problem-solving. By doing so disputants develop an understanding of the sources of their conflict. The trade-off is between the efficiency gained (SOS approach) and the insights achieved (PSS approach).

That study was about community mediation. Switching back to the international arena, we find that directive or formulative mediators are more successful in attaining agreements. The less-directive facilitators are typically less successful. Thus, a more forceful approach works better in international than domestic negotiations. This may be due to the issue I raised earlier, namely, representatives from sovereign nations seem to respect force, which can also provide a face-saving cover for concessions.

Two more mediation findings are interesting. One comes from a 1994 study by Donald Conlon and his colleagues.[21] They found that if a mediator can establish a reputation for being fair (not neutral), he or she then has more latitude to change the negotiation process from settlement-oriented to problem solving. For example, the mediator may point to an even-split solution and refer to this as a compromise. Negotiators in the experiment typically reacted by saying: "yes, you are right about that, and we can take that agreement now," but "we can also try harder by working toward an agreement that is better than

compromise." By encouraging the disputants to work harder, the fair mediators moved them in the direction of integrative or "win-win" agreements.

There are also reputational costs for mediators. In his 1972 article, Oran Young discussed incentives for mediators, referred to as intermediaries.[22] The reputational costs and benefits for mediators make them act more like negotiators on the inside than third parties coming in from the outside. The type of agreement achieved makes a difference for them as well. Knowing what those incentives are puts negotiators in a position to influence the third party's behavior.

Walker: *Interesting. So are there other conditions for effective mediation that you would like to touch on in addition to these different styles?*

Druckman: Yes, electronic mediation.

Walker: *You said it is also called robotics.*

Druckman: Yes, we have been working on automated technologies for a long time, beginning with research on screen mediation. An electronic mediator appears following an impasse. The mediator asks questions, provides a diagnosis, and gives advice on strategies. We have found that the screen mediator produces more (but not necessarily better) agreements than a human scripted with the same tasks. We have also found that the negotiators like the human better than the electronic mediator, even though more agreements occur with the latter intervention**.** This finding spurred us on to take a next step with colleagues in Denmark. Advances in robotics have made it possible to create a robot mediator. We are now comparing screen and human mediation with an interactive robot. I have experienced the robot and can attest that you feel like you are talking to a gender-neutral human with facial expressions and a voice. These are Telenoid robots that look like mannequins in a department store window. They have bald heads and a human-like body with the electronics neatly compacted inside a zipped pocket in their backs. A challenge is to create a gender-neutral voice.

Walker: *Are those very widespread, or mostly in Denmark at the moment?*

Druckman: They are manufactured in Japan. Our study is part of a larger project on robotics sponsored by the Carlsberg Foundation. It is being conducted with my colleagues from Vienna, Austria, the same group that worked with me on screen mediation earlier. We will soon have results that address the issue of comparative benefits for the different types of mediation. But we also address some of the ethical

issues surrounding replacing humans for performing complex tasks. It is interesting to speculate on a place for robot mediators in dangerous negotiations such as engaging in peace talks during violent conflict and attempting to release hostages being held for various types of ransoms. For these talks, robots present less risk to human life.

Walker: *Could be a lot of potential there. Your recent study on summitry, published with Peter Wallensteen, is also interesting.[23] What were your key findings?*

Druckman: Summitry is not as effective as a lot of people think it is. We have a historical data set of Soviet/Russia-US summits that goes from the end of World War II through most of the Obama administration, a total of 117 cases. The statistical analyses showed that the summits were motivated by conflict. However, they did not manage the conflict. In other words, the levels of conflict between these nations did not change from before the meeting to after. Even when the data are lagged a couple of months the conflict level did not change. We concluded that summits are ineffective tools for managing conflicts.

But let's go back to the contact hypothesis. There may be other advantages for communicating *per se,* for staying in touch with each other. I would much prefer to have leaders interact informally, outside of the glare of the media. Summits may be doomed before they occur, largely because of exposure. Informal behind the scenes contact among leaders is likely to work better. This is also known as back-channel communication.

Walker: *Given that, what are some important implications for the Putin-Trump relationship?*

Druckman: Do not go to the summit but remain in contact. Talk to each other. However, there is another finding from the summit research that may be even more interesting. The Soviets/Russians seem to have dual motives. While they are signing U.N. agreements in cooperation with the world's nations and attending summits, they are also fomenting wars elsewhere in the world. So on the one hand; they appear to be good guys, members of the international community. On the other hand, they are in the business of keeping the rest of the world on edge. Although the explanation for this behavior evades us, the data are clear that this has been occurring for a long time. In addition, we find that Russians prefer bilateral rather than multilateral summits. Perhaps they are motivated by status-seeking. They look good when they speak directly to a US president.

Walker: *You have had a very prolific and highly regarded career. What would you say the prospects are for using the sort of research that you have shared with us for improving both the practice of resolving conflicts and the chances for creating a more peaceful planet?*

Druckman: Those are good questions. First, I will say that we are better off as a species for doing empirical or data-driven research and teaching our students the skills they need to do that kind of research. Evidence-based research is at least as good, and probably a better, basis for policy as any other approach... The problem is that people who make the big decisions in organizations do not have the training, time, energy, or incentive for translating the research to practice. Some of us have taken up the challenge. I received a grant from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) for creating a bridge between research findings and practice. We developed sixteen narratives on topics such as integrative agreements, alternatives, power, turning points, and time pressure. After reading the narratives, participants took part in exercises where they applied the research findings. One exercise put them in the role of an analyst who uses the narratives to make sense of the case. Another exercise created the role of a strategist who uses the knowledge to suggest ways to move the talks forward. A third exercise placed them in the role of a designer of training simulations. An evaluative survey was followed by a debriefing of the workshop. The evaluations showed positive impacts on learning the concepts that were being taught. We did these workshops with UN civil servants coming from many different countries as well as with a variety of student groups across the globe.

Stemming in part from these training workshops, Noam Ebner and I developed a line of research on the relative benefits of role play design. We demonstrated that designers of exercises learn concepts better than role players in those exercises or than those who only listen to lectures. Our first article on this research appeared in a 2008 issue of the journal *Simulation & Gaming*[24]. A more recent article appears in a 2018 issue of the *Journal of Management Education (JME)*.[25] The *JME* article also showed that stronger learning benefits are attained by designers than by those who listen to a lecture. The results also showed that the designers outperformed students who did case study analyses that illuminated the same concepts. A number of chapters on these issues appeared in the years between these articles. A practical suggestion emanating from these findings is that design exercises should be included along with role plays in negotiation, mediation, and organization behavior classes. The design experience contributes to concept learning. The role plays provide opportunities to practice strategies and tactics.

I was a consultant for more than twenty years, working for D.C. firms and the National Research Council. These jobs provided opportunities to influence the government and other policy communities. I got to know some of the policymakers fairly well, helping them to organize their negotiations. My colleague Lynn Wagner does this full time as a professional consultant. She attends multilateral

environmental negotiations and provides advice to delegations. If you get yourself in a position where you are part of the system, without being co-opted by that system, then you can still be the outsider giving advice.

With these opportunities, it is important to address two questions: What are we trying to influence and how best to pull that off? One must understand the difference between settlements and resolutions, when a turning point occurs and what to do about it, the difference between distributive and integrative bargaining, and the various mediator approaches. Another challenge is to translate from social science jargon to familiar words that practitioners can relate to. I do not know if we have been successful.

We discuss many of these challenges in a special 2000 issue of the *American Behavioral Scientist* titled "Public and Private Cooperation in the Beltway."[26] My colleagues and I wrote about our consulting experiences. Rather than pat ourselves on the back for any accomplishments, we described what the opportunities were and how we dealt with those challenges. That was a useful writing experience. I realized that few social scientists have those opportunities.

Walker: *Do you have any closing thoughts about Peace Research and its applications?*

Druckman: There are different peace research communities defined by philosophy (or epistemology) and methodology. My brand of research is closer to a positivist philosophy and tends to be systematic. I prefer to use multiple methods rather than argue for or against any particular approach to research or practice. The findings that I have discussed in this interview come from studies done in this eclectic tradition. Some derive from laboratory experiments, while others come from single and comparative case studies involving interviews and archival documents. The debate that has energized me is between internal and external validity. The former refers to the design of experiments intended to produce clear (relatively unambiguous) results. The latter deals with generality or the extent to which findings are relevant to larger populations. My quest has been to find a bridge between these two types of validities. I discuss this in some detail in my 2005 book called *Doing Research.*[27]

Another issue, mentioned at the outset of the interview, concerns the focus of research on micro or macro levels. Again, I prefer to find the connections between the small group and the collective as shown in my recent study with Lynn Wagner on the role of justice in peace agreements. I was a demanding professor in the sense of pushing my students to seek bridges between small and large data collections and between the micro and macro levels. To hear directly from some of these students, see the legacy article published in a 2018 issue of *Negotiation and Conflict Management* by Beriker, Allan, Larson, and Wagner.[28]

Yet another divide in our field is between researchers and practitioners. Both are important. Again, I search for bridges between these communities. The training workshops that I described earlier are an example. Research findings were applied to solve real-world problems. It seems to me that the researchers are eager to seek applications for their work. Practitioners are less inclined to do research, including evaluations of their practices. Yet these communities often depend on each other; researchers need the cases that come from practice; practitioners need tools to evaluate their interventions. One of the disappointments in our field has been a notable lack of evaluations of applications. This is particularly notable in the interactive conflict resolution movement developed by my colleagues and discussed earlier in the interview. Problems of anonymity notwithstanding, this is an area where researcher-practitioner collaborations would be helpful. Researchers can develop the methods for evaluation while practitioners can be inventive in using these methods without breaching ethical norms. We need to move beyond anecdotes or stories as a means for documenting our successes and failures. We need to more fully embrace the idea of being practical academics, to be "pracademics."

Walker: *And are there any other closing comments you want to leave us with?*

Druckman: I think I have covered a lot of territory in my responses to your questions. It is my hope that your readers will get a sense of this large, dynamic field. I am looking forward to the workshop tomorrow. We will explore some of the topics discussed above in more depth and venture into other areas. Participants will be challenged to apply the research in several case exercises. This will be an incubator for developing an appreciation for the bridge between research and practice, for becoming pracademics.

Thank you very much for inviting me to do this interview.

Walker: *Thank you for sharing your experience and your expertise. You know, you are an author that we use in many of our courses. And I think our students and faculty have an amazing opportunity to spend part of a day with you and learn from your research; so we are excited.*

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